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1956] RECENT DECISIONS lOll 
LABOR LAw-LMRA-DISCRIMINATION DISCHARGE-EFFECT OF LEGAL 
GROUND FOR D1scHARGE WHERE PossrnLE DUAL MOTIVATION EXISTS-Re-
spondent discharged an employee under the terms of a union contract 
which provided that employees could be discharged for failure to carry 
out the employer's orders. It was undisputed that the employee had failed 
to submit required reports on at least two occasions. A complaint alleging 
the commission of an unfair labor practice was filed. The National Labor 
Relations Board1 found that the employee had been discharged as a :re-
prisal for his union activities in violation of section 8 (a)(l) of the amended 
National Labor Relations Act.2 The Board ordered reinstatement under 
section IO (c) of the act. In an action by the Board seeking enforcement of 
1 Huber and Huber Motor Express, 109 N.L.R.B. 295 (1954). 
2 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (a){l) 
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its order, held, enforcement denied. Where the Board could as reasonably 
infer a proper collateral motive as an improper one, the act of the manage-
ment cannot be set aside as being improperly motivated. NLRB v. Huber 
and Huber Motor Express, (5th Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 748. 
Section 10 (c) of the original NLRA, which empowered the NLRB to 
order reinstatement in unfair labor practice cases,3 was qualified by a 
clause in the amended NLRA which forbids reinstatement if the discharge 
was "for cause."4 Since it is well established, even apart from the amend-
ment, that discharge for cause does not provide grounds for reinstatement,!• 
this provision creates problems of interpretation only when there have 
been both discriminatory and proper grounds for discharge. Unfortunately, 
the rationale of the decision i_n the principal case is not made clear by the 
court and different interpretations are possible. If the court meant to 
hold that where the evidence shows both proper and improper grounds 
for discharge, the Board can no longer find as a matter of law that the em-
ployer has violated the act and accordingly order reinstatement, the holding 
is inconsistent with a long line of both Board and court decisions.6 Such a 
rationale would imply that where both proper and improper grounds for q.is-
charge exist, the Board may not inquire into the actual motive of the em-
ployer for discharging the employee, but must find the discharge to be 
proper. The Board's approach in cases where there is a possibility of dual 
motivation has been to determine if in fact the employer was motivated at 
least in part by anti-union animus. If such were the case, a violation was 
found and reinstatement ordered.7 While this' approach appears sound, the 
fact remains that the actual result in a number of cases indicates that union 
affiliation on the part of the discharged employee seemed to insulate him 
from discharge, even for the most serious misconduct. 8 Several court de-
cisions under the original NLRA at least impliedly criticized the Board 
for its over-zealous attitude in this respect and refused to enforce orders 
of reinstatement on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify 
a Generally under §8 (a) (1) or §8 (a) (3) of the amended NLRA. 
4 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 147, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160 (c). 
Ii NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615 (1936); Ballston-
Stillwater Knitting Co. v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 758; NLRB v. Citizen• 
News Co., (9th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 970. 
6 NLRB v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., (8th Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 837; 
Piedmont Shirt Co. v. NLRB, (4th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 739; Sorens Motor Co., 106 
N.L.R.B. 652 (1953). 
7 See NLRB THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 70 (1939); 7 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 797 (1939). 
8 Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc., IO N.L.R.B. 1299 (1939). In a particularly 
extreme decision, the Board found that an employee had been discriminatorily discharged 
despite uncontradicted evidence to the effect that he was derelict in his duties, played 
cards during 'lvorking hours and was incapable of properly carrying out his assigned task 
which consisted of work in vital aircraft forgings. Wyman-Gordon Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 561 
(1945). The reviewing court termed the decision "astounding" and refused to enforce 
the Board's order of reinstatement Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1946) 153 
F. (2d) 480. 
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a finding of discriminatory discharge.9 Since the burden of proving dis-
criminatory discharge rests on the General Counsel of the Board, who must 
establish this fact by a preponderance of the evidence,10 these decisions 
rest fundamentally on the ground that he did not sustain his burden of 
proof. This criticism of the Board's failure to maintain more exacting 
standards with regard to the burden of proof imposed on the General 
Counsel is reflected in a statement issued by the House Committee which 
revised section 10 (c),U indicating that the primary purpose of the amended 
provision was to remind the Board of its duty with regard to problems of 
proof. This theory is supported by the fact that the amended section 
10 (c) makes still further reference to evidentiary matters which do not 
appear in the original section. A number of recent Board decisions, re-
fusing to make a finding of discriminatory discharge, manifest in their 
language a more acute awareness on the part of the Board of its duty to 
establish a violation of the act by a preponderance of the evidence, rather 
than by shadowy suspicions and inferences.12 This realization is enforced 
by the provisions of section 10 ( c) of the amended NLRA and by section 
10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act13 which now make the Board's 
findings of fact conclusive on review only if supported by substantial 
evidence on the whole record. The Supreme Court has held that these 
provisions require reviewing courts to assume more responsibility for the 
reasonableness and fairness of Board decisions.14 It may well be that the 
theory of the court in the principal case, as in other recent cases,15 was 
merely that where the Board can as reasonably infer a proper motive on 
the part of the employer in taking a certain course of action as an unlawful 
motive, substantial evidence has not proved the employer to be guilty of 
an unfair labor practice. This seems likely since the same court recently 
decided a case of alleged evasion of statutory obligation to bargain on an 
identical rationale.16 The only other possible explanation for the decision 
in the case is that the court interpreted the amended section 10 ( c) to 
provide that while the Board may still find a discriminatory discharge in 
dual motivation cases, it may nevertheless not order reinstatement under 
the qualifying clause of section 10 (c). A literal reading of the clause might 
9 Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. NLRB, note 4 supra; Boeing Airplane Co. v. 
NLRB, (10th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 423; NLRB v. Montgomery Ward and Co., (8th 
Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 486. 
10 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 147, 29 U.S.C. (1952) 160 (c). 
11 H. Rep. 245, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 42 (1947): "A third change [in section 10 (c)] 
forbids the Board to reinstate an individual unless the weight of the evidence shows that 
the individual was not suspended or discharged for cause." 
12 Western Textile Products Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 162 (1953); Milwaukee Nash Co., 105 
N.L.R.B. 684 (1953); Radio Industries, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 912 (1952). 
13 60 Stat. L. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1009 (e). 
14 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456 (1951). 
15 NLRB v. Arthur Winer, Inc., (7th Cir. 1952) 194 F., (2d) 370; NLRB v. Poly-
nesian Arts, Inc., (6th Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 846; NLRB v. American Thread Co., (5th 
Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 381. 
16 NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., (5th Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 848. 
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lend support to this view, but, since the very purpose of section IO (c) is 
to empower the Board to prevent unfair labor practices, such an inter~ 
pretation would involve a particularly unlikely internal contradiction in 
the terms of the act. 
Joy Tannian, S. Ed. 
